An easier way to think about the Raven Paradox?
There's a famous logical paradox put forward by Carl Gustav Hempel regarding observations and logical inference. Lets say we have some statement we're interested in like "all raven's are black". In logical terms you could write that as "if something is a raven, then that thing is black" or "Raven → Black". And by formal logic this is equivalent to the contrapositive statement that "if something isn't black, it's not a raven" or "not Black → not Raven". So far so good. But if we were to go out looking for evidence that the original statement was true then most people would readily accept that looking at a raven and finding that it's black is evidence towards the idea that all ravens are black. But looking at instances of the contrapositive, say a white object that happens to be a rabbit it seems a bit odd to count that as evidence towards the proposition that all ravens are black, even if it's an instance...